Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

Modelowanie komputerowe odgrywa istotną rolę we współczesnej nauce. Epistemologiczna rola, jaką odgrywają takie modele oraz prowadzone na ich bazie symulacje skłaniają do postawienia pytań o możliwe użycie podobnych metod w filozofii. Pomysły wykorzystania narzędzi matematycznych do sformułowania koncepcji filozoficznych sięgają czasów Barucha Spinozy i Isaaca Newtona. Newtonowska filozofia przyrody stała się przykładem udanego zastosowania matematycznych rozważań do opisu przyrody na poziomie fundamentalnym. Oczywiście podejście Newtona otworzyło zarówno nowe obszary badań w fizyce, jak i stało się źródłem dla nowych rozważań o (...) rzeczywistości fizycznej. Według Michała Hellera niektóre teorie fizyczne można traktować jako specyficzne formalizacje koncepcji filozoficznych. Modelowanie komputerowe w filozofii może być traktowane jako rozszerzenie tej idei, co będę starał się ukazać w niniejszym artykule. Będę również rozważał rolę modelowania komputerowego jako źródła nowych metafor filozoficznych zgodnie z koncepcją technologii definiującej D. J. Boltera. Rozważania te wiodą do konkluzji mówiącej, że w metodologii filozofii zachodzą istotne zmiany. Nowe podejście nie sugeruje odrzucenia bądź zanegowania dotychczasowych metod, a wskazuje raczej nowe narzędzie analityczne filozofii i źródło inspirujących metafor. (shrink)

I borrow part of the title of my paper from Susan Sontag. In 2003, a year before her death, Susan Sontag published an essay entitled Regarding the Pain of Others. There she takes up the subject of the moral significance of presenting the views of war, violent human death exposed to the lenses of cameras. Her approach to the contemporary issue of mediatisation through the image of the sight of human suffering provokes a question: Do we need teleethics today, the (...) ethics of remote moral relations? Using the method of comparative analysis in the area of cultural determinants of ethics, I draw attention to the contemporary challenges that the culture of late modernity imposes on the morality of everyday life. My thesis is this: The images of human suffering provided by the media reveal the imperfection of our morality. As moral subjects, we are not prepared to respond to the suffering of human beings absent from face-to-face relationships. So, we need teleethics. The paper is devoted to this issue. (shrink)

I develop in this paper a conception of artefacts based on L. Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance. My approach peruses the notion of frame, which was invented in cognitive psychology as an operationisable extension of this philosophical idea. Following the metaphor of life-cycle I show how this schematic notion of frame may be filled with the content relevant for artefacts if we consider them from the point of view of their histories. The resulting conception of artefacts provides a new insight (...) into the current debate on artefact categorisation. (shrink)

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie wpływu Kantowskiej koncepcji wolności i zła na myśl Schellinga z tzw. pisma o wolności. W pierwszej części przedstawiam trudności wyjaśnienia zła jako kategorii moralnej na gruncie koncepcji wolności ujętej jako racjonalna autonomia i przedstawionej w Uzasadnieniu metafizyki moralności i Krytyce praktycznego rozumu: Kant utożsamia wolność z posłuszeństwem prawu moralnemu i tym samym nie jest w stanie ugruntować możliwości samego wyboru dobra i zła, jak również osobowego i jednostkowego charakteru wolności człowieka jako zmysłowo-rozumnej całości. Następnie pokazuję niesatysfakcjonującą (...) próbę rozwiązania tych trudności w Religii w obrębie rozumu, w której, na gruncie teorii maksym, podejmuje on problem możliwości zła jako aktu wolności: Kant nie jest w stanie określić statusu skłonności do zła jako pozaempirycznej podstawy zła, jak i tegoż powszechności. W drugiej części omawiam Schellinga oryginalną koncepcję wolności, która ukazuje jej osobowy i jednostkowy charakter na gruncie nowej ontologii ja jako bytu swobodnie się samookreślającego. Koncepcja ta pozwoliła mu podjąć próbę rozwiązania przejętego od Kanta problemu zła. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to assess the situation in terms of wage inequality and identify factors influencing changes in the levels, dynamics and relations of wages in voivodeships in Poland in 2012–2021. In Poland, during the analyzed period, an economic crisis occurred in 2012 as a consequence of the crisis of 2008–2009 and since 2020. Average monthly gross wages in Poland will be used for this purpose. Based on this data, deviations, relationships, and rates of change will be (...) calculated. To carry out the analysis and evaluation, I will use statistical data published in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw for the years 2012–2021. In this article, the region will be identified with the voivodeship, according to the administrative division. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

In this paper, I will analyse the relation between a sense of agency and free will. It is often proposed that by investigating the former, we can find a way of judging when an action is voluntary. Haggard seems to be one of the authors believing so. To answer if this assumption is correct, I will: 1) analyse the categories of free will and agency; 2) define the sense of agency; 3) describe ways of investigating the sense of agency; 4) (...) describe models of emergence of the sense of agency; 5) analyse the relation between agency and responsibility. I will end by discussing the actual possibility of using the sense of agency measurements (as described in experimental sciences) as markers of free will. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

Pondering the question of free will in the context of probability allows us to take a fresh look at a number of old problems. We are able to avoid deterministic entrapments and attempt to look at free will as an outcome of the entire decision-making system. In my paper, I will argue that free will should be considered in the context of a complex system of decisions, not individual cases. The proposed system will be probabilistic in character, so it will (...) be embedded in the calculus of probability. To achieve the stated goal, I will refer to two areas of Carnap’s interest: the relationship between free will and determinism, and the probability-based decision-making system. First, I will present Carnap’s compatibilist position. On this basis, I will show how free will can be examined on deterministic grounds. Then I will present Carnap’s probabilistic project—the so-called logical interpretation of probability. In addition to presenting its characteristics and functionality, I will argue for its usefulness in the context of decision analysis and its immunity to problems associated with determinism. Finally, I will show how the two mentioned elements can be combined, as a result of which I will present a concept for a probabilistic analysis of free will. In this context, I will identify free will with the individual characteristics of the system. My main aim is to present the theme of free will in the light of a formal analysis based on probability rather than metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to outline the idea of the anarchistic egoism included in Max Stirner's "Ego and His Own". I tried to represent Stirner as an original philosopher who visibly distinguished himself among other thinkers of his days. My aim was also defend him from various attacks of his critics and adversaries who reproached him for being inconsistent or perplexed in the very vulnerable spots of his work. In my opinion 'being awkward' which Camus accuses Stirner (...) of, is nothing else than a tough consequence of the egoistic philosophy which forced the author of "Ego and His Own" to stop his deduction in some point. By referring to Nietzsche and existentialists I endeavoured to show Stirner's Egoist as a precursor of the Nietzsche's Superman and the Camus's Stranger. In the evolution of an idea this two directions were two different ways of extending the construction which foundations were laid down by Stirner. That is why I find Max Stirner one of the most influential thinker of the 10th century who had a great impact on formation of the new look on man and his world. This article is about solitude, alienation, egoism, strength and power which born every time when the conscious and sovereign human being is faced with the indifferent, trivial and inert world. (shrink)

In modern science, the theory of probability is one of the basic tools. Scientists using probability often refer to its objective interpretation. They emphasize that their probabilistic hypotheses concern objective facts, not degrees of belief. Accordingly, the following questions arise: What is the meaning of this type of probabilistic hypothesis? Is the assumption of objectivity necessary? The paper addresses these questions by analyzing objective probability in the context of the scientific debate on determinism. Two types of arguments will be presented. (...) On the one hand, there is the assertion that objective probability can exist only in an indeterministic world. Then, on the other hand — I analyze the assertions of those who believe in the co‑existence of objective probability and determinism. As a result I show that the acceptance of deterministic and indeterministic fields as possible areas where objective probability can occur is extremely problematic. Depending on the chosen area we encounter different types of problems. Therefore, I show that a significant number of these problems are associated with the acceptance of incorrect metaphysical assumptions. And finally, I postulate that the objectivity of probability can be reduced to the epistemic variant. (shrink)

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

LEGO bricks have an enormous educational potential. The article analyzes the possibility of using the bricks in teaching philosophy. As a case in point, it describes the LEGO-LOGOS project, a method where the bricks have been successfully used in opening students to philosophical ideas. The project makes use of play (in this case with the LEGO bricks) to introduce students to philosophy and philosophizing. It tackles one of the biggest obstacles in teaching this subject, that is the resistance of students (...) to formulate and express their thoughts as the method allows for a free and creative expression of ideas and interpretations. The article describes the structure of the classes where the method is to be used and provides an analysis of educational and philosophical assumptions of LEGO-LOGOS also touching on the possibility of using the method as a tool in the school setting and beyond. (shrink)

The author discusses the problem of homosexuality in the Hellenic period. The presented analyses are not only historical as the author shows in detail reviewing the evidence of homosexual behaviour, but he also discusses the forms and meanings of that behaviour. He is specially interested in the axiological context. He tries to recreate the system of evaluations according to which these sexual activities were seen as positive and shows the borderline beyond which homosexuality was condemned.

Migration and refugeeism have become widespread phenomena in the contemporary world. They affect both the migrants’ countries of origin, as well as transit and target countries. The contemporary migrant crisis is becoming a challenge not only for politicians, diplomats and economists, but also for sociologists, demographers and philosophers. It is also a challenge for the Catholic Church because it affects millions of Christians to whose countries migrants and refugees are coming. The purpose of this article is to explain the social (...) teaching of the Church in this regard. It contains examples of statements made by the Second Vatican Council and the Popes: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify the hard problem of access for epistemological disjunctivism (ED): given that perceptual experience E is opaque with respect to its own epistemic properties, subject S is not in a position to know epistemic proposition (i) (that E is factive with respect to empirical proposition p) just by having E and/or reflecting on E. This is the case even if (i) is true. I first motivate the hard problem of access (Section 2) and then reconstruct and (...) analyze three of the ways in which EDists have argued for the internal accessibility of the factive character of perceptual experience. These arguments explain internal access in terms of the unity of perceptual and rational capacities (Section 3), favoring support (Section 4), and the outward-looking model of self-knowledge (Section 5). My conclusion (Section 6) is that none of these responses works. I then suggest how ED might be modified to succeed as an access internalist epistemology. (shrink)

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...) of its rational etiology. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)

In his essay, Science as a Vocation, Max Weber wrote that the fate of our epoch, characterised by a rationalisation and intellectualisation proper to it, together, primarily, with the fact that we need no longer have recourse to magical means, consists of the disappearance from public life of the ultimate and most sublime values. They may be found in the non-wordly domain of mysticism or in the brotherhood of direct relations binding individuals. The ultimate consequence of subjecting a political order (...) to a scientific rationalisation is the withdrawal from public life into the sphere of religious contemplation or into privacy, the narrow circle of the family and the closest of friends. This means, in fact, the end of politics, at least in its classic form as described by Aristotle. Politics ceases to be an instrument used to solve the problems of the community and becomes a problem in its own right, needing to be solved with the help of science, the only instrument regarded as capable of overcoming any difficulty. (shrink)

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

_The dynamic development of medical technologies, i.e. the use of medicinal products and medical procedures, requires reflection on the ways to ensure the safety of patients and people using such methods of treatment (medical professionals) in legal and ethical terms. This applies in particular to the currently observed influence of the media on the actions taken in the health care system in Poland as well as individual decisions of patients on the use of the offered drugs and other medical procedures._ (...) _The article presents selected legal provisions defining the conditions for the use of medicinal products (drugs) and experimental medical procedures. The basic element of the considerations is to indicate the legal conditions for this type of use of medical technologies understood in this way, also in a broader context – with the characteristics of ethical conditions for „the media message”, including ensuring its proper quality for the protection of public health._. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

In this paper, I use the predictive processing theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind-independent world. My main (...) goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either. (shrink)

This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...) expressed without the employment of disjunction. (shrink)